Looking the Other Way: A Critique of the Fair-Lending Enforcement System and a Plan to Fix It by Ross, Stephen L. & Yinger, John
Syracuse University 
SURFACE 
Center for Policy Research Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs 
2002 
Looking the Other Way: A Critique of the Fair-Lending 
Enforcement System and a Plan to Fix It 
Stephen L. Ross 
University of Connecticut, Department of Economics 
John Yinger 
Syracuse University, jyinger@maxwell.syr.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://surface.syr.edu/cpr 
 Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Ross, Stephen L. and Yinger, John, "Looking the Other Way: A Critique of the Fair-Lending Enforcement 
System and a Plan to Fix It" (2002). Center for Policy Research. 19. 
https://surface.syr.edu/cpr/19 
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public 
Affairs at SURFACE. It has been accepted for inclusion in Center for Policy Research by an authorized administrator 
of SURFACE. For more information, please contact surface@syr.edu. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Looking the Other Way: A Critique of the 
Fair-Lending Enforcement System 
and a Plan to Fix It 
 
6WHSKHQ/5RVVDQG
-RKQ<LQJHU
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1R
 
Stephen L. Ross is Associate Professor of 
Economics at the University of Connecticut. 
John Yinger is Trustee Professor of Public 
Administration, and Senior Research Associate, 
Center for Policy Research, the Maxwell School of 
Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse 
University. 
This Policy Brief is based on a forthcoming book 
by Professors Ross and Yinger titled The Color of 
Credit: Mortgage Discrimination, Research 
Methodology, and Fair-Lending Policy (MIT 
Press). 
The Policy Brief series is a collection of essays on 
current public policy issues in aging, health, 
income security, metropolitan studies, and related 
research done by or on behalf of the Center for 
Policy Research (CPR) at the Maxwell School of 
Syracuse University. 
Single copies of this publication may be obtained 
at no cost from the CPR Web site at <http://www-
cpr.maxwell.syr.edu> or from the Center for 
Policy Research, 426 Eggers Hall, Syracuse, NY 
13244-1020. 
© 2002, Syracuse University. This publication may 
be distributed freely for educational and researcher 
uses as long as this copyright notice is attached. 
No commercial use of this material may be made 
without express written permission. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3ROLF\%ULHI
Looking the Other Way: A Critique of the 
Fair-Lending Enforcement System 
and a Plan to Fix It 

6WHSKHQ/5RVVDQG
-RKQ<LQJHU
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Looking the Other Way: A Critique of the 
Fair-Lending Enforcement System 
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Introduction 
In 2001, the homeownership rate in the United States reached 67.8 
percent—an all-time high. The benefits of homeownership were not 
evenly spread across ethnic groups, however. In fact, the 
homeownership rate was 74.3 percent for non-Hispanic whites, 48.4 
percent for non-Hispanic blacks, and 47.3 percent for Hispanics 
(U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 2002, Table 
29). See Figure 1. These homeownership gaps undoubtedly have 
many causes, but one of the key suspects is discrimination in 
mortgage lending. The vast majority of households cannot buy a 
house without a mortgage loan, and discriminatory barriers to 
obtaining a mortgage could have a dramatic impact on 
homeownership. 
A hint about the possible role of discrimination in mortgage lending 
comes from data collected under the Home Mortgage Disclosure 
Act (HMDA), which records the ethnicity of the applicant and the 
disposition of the application for virtually all the mortgage 
applications filed in the United States. In 2000, black applicants 
were twice as likely as white applicants to be turned down for a 
loan, and Hispanic applicants were 41 percent more likely to be 
turned down (FFIEC 2001b). These loan-approval disparities do not 
prove that blacks and Hispanics face discrimination in mortgage 
lending, because they do not account for possible differences in loan 
features or borrower creditworthiness across groups. Nevertheless, 
the differences are so dramatic that they focus attention on the 
possibility that this type of discrimination might exist.  
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Figure 1.  Homeownership Rates, 1983-2001
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The purpose of this policy brief is to explore the possibility that 
mortgage lending discrimination contributes to ethnic disparities in 
homeownership, to evaluate the current fair-lending enforcement 
system, and to propose reforms in that system to make it more 
effective in uncovering—and, ultimately, eliminating—mortgage 
lending discrimination. 
What Is Discrimination in Mortgage Lending? 
Discrimination in mortgage lending is prohibited by the Fair 
Housing Act of 1968 (FaHA) and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act 
of 1974 (ECOA).1 According to ECOA, as amended, 
It shall be unlawful for any creditor to discriminate 
against any applicant, with respect to any aspect of a 
credit transaction— 
(1) on the basis of race, color, religion, national 
origin, sex or marital status, or age (provided 
the applicant has the capacity to contract).2 
Source: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 2002, 
Table 29. 
Stephen L. Ross and John Yinger 
3 
ECOA also assigns fair-lending enforcement authority to the same 
federal financial institutions (namely the Office of Thrift 
Supervision, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the 
Federal Reserve, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) 
that oversee other aspects of lender behavior. Each of these 
institutions regulates a different set of lenders. See FFIEC (2001a). 
According to ECOA, enforcement authority for mortgage bankers, 
which are non-depository lenders, is assigned to the Federal Trade 
Commission.3 
FaHA also takes a strong stand against lending discrimination. This 
act gives enforcement power to the Departments of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD) and of Justice. In general, Justice is 
entitled to prosecute cases involving a “pattern and practice” of 
discrimination or an issue of national importance, whereas HUD is 
the main agency for dealing with discrimination complaints.4 
The Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC), 
which consists of all the federal financial regulatory institutions, 
provides a guide to the fair-lending regulations of its members. This 
guide covers discrimination in many types of actions by lenders. For 
example, this guide says that it would be discrimination for a lender 
to “refuse to extend credit or use different standards in determining 
whether to extend credit” based on an applicant’s membership in a 
legally protected class (FFIEC 1999, ii). 
These civil rights laws also make a key distinction between different 
types of discrimination. As the FFIEC guide puts it: 
The courts have recognized three methods of proof of 
lending discrimination under the ECOA and the FH 
Act: 
• Overt evidence of disparate treatment 
• Comparative evidence of disparate treatment 
• Evidence of disparate impact. 
The existence of illegal disparate treatment may be 
established either by statements revealing that a lender 
explicitly considered prohibited factors (overt 
evidence) or by differences in treatment that are not 
Metropolitan Studies Program Policy Brief 
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fully explained by legitimate nondiscriminatory factors 
(comparative evidence). 
When a lender applies a racially or otherwise neutral 
policy or practice equally to all credit applicants, but 
the policy or practice disproportionately excludes or 
burdens certain persons on a prohibited basis, the policy 
or practice is described as having a “disparate 
impact.”(FFIEC 1999, ii-iv) 
In this policy brief, the behaviors identified by the first two 
“methods of proof,” overt and comparative, will be called 
“disparate-treatment” discrimination, and careful attention will be 
paid to both disparate-treatment and disparate-impact 
discrimination. Indeed, recognizing that both types of discrimination 
exist is critical for evaluating—and reforming—the fair-lending 
enforcement system. 
Finally, a case involving disparate-impact discrimination has three 
steps (FFIEC 1999). The first step is to determine whether a practice 
has a disparate impact on a legally protected class of people. The 
second step is to determine whether the practice can be justified on 
the grounds of business necessity, and the third step is to determine 
whether there exists an alternative practice that achieves the same 
business objectives without the same disparate impact. Disparate-
impact discrimination in lending is said to exist if (a) an 
enforcement agency finds that a lending practice has a disparate 
impact on a protected group and either (b) the lender cannot show 
that the practice is justified on the grounds of business necessity or 
(c) the enforcement agency shows that this disparate impact can be 
avoided through the use of an alternative practice that achieves the 
same business objectives. Although these steps are well established 
in law, the precise legal requirements for building a prima facie case 
for discrimination, part (a), or for building a business necessity 
defense, part (b), are not yet clear (Mahoney 1998). 
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Why Should We Care about Discrimination in 
Mortgage Lending? 
Nobody claims to be in favor of mortgage lending discrimination, of 
course, but some people do not believe that we need to worry about 
it. Discrimination is a thing of the past, they say, and no lender 
could survive in today’s competitive market if it practiced 
discrimination. For three principal reasons, we believe that this 
position is incorrect and that this nation should still care about 
discrimination in mortgage lending.5 These reasons are the lack of 
change in the HMDA data, the results of a major study of mortgage 
lending discrimination, and the possibility of extensive disparate-
impact discrimination. 
Lack of Change in the HMDA Data 
If discrimination were disappearing from mortgage markets, one 
would expect the loan-approval disparities in the HMDA data to be 
declining over time.6 This has not been the case. In fact, the 
black/white loan-denial ratio has fluctuated around 2.0 since 1995, 
with a high of 2.07 in 1998 and a low of 1.92 in 1999.7 The current 
ratio, 2.0, is slightly higher than the 1995 ratio, 1.95. See Figure 2. 
The Hispanic/white denial ratio has fluctuated around the lower 
value of 1.5, but it exhibits a similar pattern over time, with a 
relatively high value in 1998 and a relatively low value in 1999. Its 
current value, 1.41, is slightly below its value in 1995, 1.43. 
Evidence from the Boston Fed Study 
An important study based on data from 1990, Munnell et al. (1996), 
found extensive evidence of mortgage lending discrimination. This 
study, which is known as the Boston Fed Study because its authors 
were researchers at the Boston Federal Reserve Bank, supplemented 
the HMDA data with extensive information on individual loan 
applications, including measures of the applicant’s credit history. 
On the basis of these data, this study found that black and Hispanic 
applicants are 82 percent more likely to be turned down for a loan 
than are equivalent white applicants.8 This result provides strong 
evidence of discrimination. 
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Figure 2. Conventional Home-Purchase Loan-Denial Ratios by Year
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This study’s methodology has been criticized by many scholars. 
However, several careful examinations of its data and methods 
conclude that the study’s main result cannot be explained by most of 
the issues raised by these critics, including omitted credit variables, 
data errors, and misspecification of the estimating equation.9 See 
Carr and Megbolugbe (1993), Glennon and Stengel (1994), and 
Ross and Yinger (forthcoming). 
One issue raised by several critics appears to have more bite. 
Specifically, the Boston Fed Study cannot rule out the possibility 
that underwriting criteria differ, for legitimate business reasons, 
across lenders and that the lenders selected by black and Hispanic 
applicants are not as well suited to their credit needs as are the 
lenders selected by whites (Glennon and Stengel 1994; Stengel and 
Glennon 1999). In this context, “legitimate” variation in 
underwriting standards is defined as variation that arises because 
different lenders draw on different pools of applicants and therefore 
have different experiences about the impact of various credit 
characteristics on the probability that a borrower will default. 
Any such legitimate variation should be associated with the 
characteristics of a lender’s loan portfolio, that is, with the 
Source: FFIEC 2001. 
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characteristics of the loans a lender provides. By adding many 
characteristics of loan portfolios to the Boston Fed Study’s data set, 
Ross and Yinger (forthcoming) are able to test for this possibility. 
They find that underwriting standards do, indeed, vary across 
lenders based on portfolio characteristics, but that accounting for 
this has no impact in the estimated minority-white disparity in loan 
approval. Legitimate differences in underwriting standards cannot 
explain the Boston Fed Study’s main result, and one is left with the 
conclusion that this result is a sign of discrimination. 
The Boston Fed Study is based on 1990 data and it has not been 
replicated.10 As a result, there exists no direct evidence about the 
extent of discrimination in mortgage lending at the current time. 
Nevertheless, the Boston Fed Study provides the best available 
evidence and the HMDA data for the last several years provide no 
indication that discrimination is declining.11 
The Potential Importance of Disparate-Impact 
Discrimination 
The third reason for concern is that disparate-impact discrimination 
in mortgage lending could be widespread, even if, as several 
scholars have argued, disparate-treatment discrimination is no 
longer a serious problem. The potential importance of disparate-
impact discrimination is suggested by two principal arguments. 
First, disparate-treatment discrimination can readily be transformed 
into disparate-impact discrimination. As clearly explained by 
Lundberg (1991), economic agents who want to practice disparate-
treatment discrimination but who are prevented from doing so may 
be able to achieve virtually identical outcomes by using 
characteristics other than group membership to predict which group 
an applicant belongs to.12 This approach only works, of course, if 
there exist characteristics that are correlated with group 
membership. In the case of lending, this is clearly the case; on 
average, black and Hispanic loan applicants have poorer credit 
qualifications than do white applicants. 
The possibilities for exploiting the correlation between credit 
characteristics and group membership are demonstrated by Buist, 
Linneman, and Megbolugbe (1999) and by Blackburn and 
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Vermilyea (2001), who show, using two different data sets, that the 
loan-approval decisions of lenders can be explained either by setting 
a lower approval rate for blacks and Hispanics than for whites with a 
common set of credit standards across lenders or by devising lender-
specific underwriting standards that also predict group 
membership.13 The latter possibility is, of course, disparate-impact 
discrimination. 
The second argument for concern about disparate-impact 
discrimination is that it can easily be built into a credit-scoring or 
other automated underwriting scheme, even one that appears to treat 
all groups equally. 
This argument is important because of the recent growth in the uses 
of these schemes.14 Several private companies now provide credit 
scores, which are formulas that translate a loan applicant’s financial 
characteristics and credit history into a score designed to predict 
default on a loan. These formulas are based on a statistical analysis 
of the impact of applicant characteristics on loan performance, 
usually measured by loan default, for a sample of previous loans. 
More general automated underwriting schemes bring in additional 
explanatory variables, such as the nature of the loan or of the 
property being purchased. For example, Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac, key institutions in the secondary mortgage market, have 
developed automated underwriting schemes for use by loan 
originators who want to sell mortgages to these institutions. In some 
cases, automated underwriting schemes are so complete that 
mortgage transactions based on them are conducted entirely over the 
internet. 
As several scholars have pointed out, automated underwriting 
schemes make disparate-treatment discrimination more difficult 
because they provide a detailed formula linking applicant 
characteristics to loan decisions, without any consideration of an 
applicant’s race, ethnicity, or gender. See Avery et al. (2000); Buist, 
Linneman, and Megbolugbe (1999); and Yezer (1995). Indeed, in 
the extreme case of loans provided over the internet, the lender may 
not ever observe the applicant and may therefore not be able to use 
different underwriting criteria for different groups. The growth in 
automated underwriting does not make disparate-treatment 
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discrimination impossible, because most schemes leave some room 
for lender judgment, but it appears to lower the likelihood that this 
type of discrimination takes place. 
These scholars also point out, however, that automated underwriting 
does not rule out the possibility of disparate-impact discrimination. 
Indeed, an apparently group-neutral procedure for developing an 
automated underwriting scheme can lead to disparate-impact 
discrimination whenever groups differ on credit characteristics that 
are unobserved by the lender, such as the probability that a relative 
will be able to provide financial assistance in the case of 
unemployment or some other negative income shock. 
Suppose, for example, that an automated underwriting scheme is 
based on a statistical analysis that ignores group membership 
altogether, which appears to be the procedure behind existing 
schemes.15 In this case, the estimated underwriting weights of 
observed credit characteristics capture not only the relationship 
between these characteristics and the probability of default, which is 
entirely legitimate, but also, to the extent that the observed credit 
characteristics are correlated with group membership, the role of 
average unobserved credit characteristics for each group, which 
lenders are not allowed to consider.16 The only way to avoid 
disparate-impact discrimination in this situation is to base the 
underwriting weights in the scheme on a statistical analysis that 
includes group membership variables but then to ignore the impact 
of these variables in making a loan-approval decision. By leaving 
group membership variables out of its statistical analysis, therefore, 
an automated underwriting scheme may appear to be group neutral 
but is, in fact, introducing disparate-impact discrimination. 
More generally, it is possible to test whether one automated 
underwriting scheme represents a legitimate, that is, non-
discriminatory improvement over another scheme by determining 
whether it improves the predictions of loan performance within each 
group (Ross and Yinger forthcoming). Disparate-impact 
discrimination arises when a scheme selects either the variables used 
to rate an application or the weights placed on these variables so as 
to predict the group to which an applicant belongs. Improved 
prediction for the set of applicants from a single group, say, whites, 
Metropolitan Studies Program Policy Brief 
10 
obviously cannot be affected by provisions that predict group 
membership. As a result, switching to a scheme that is common 
across groups and that improves within-group predictions is non-
discriminatory, whereas switching to a scheme that improves overall 
predictions only by doing a better job of identifying group 
membership by definition involves disparate-impact discrimination. 
What Is the Fair-Lending Enforcement System? 
As explained earlier, many federal institutions share responsibility 
for enforcing the ECOA and FaHA. The first line of enforcement at 
depository lenders comes from the financial regulatory agencies, 
which, as noted earlier, have jointly developed a set of enforcement 
procedures (FFIEC 1999). These procedures, as implemented by the 
Federal Reserve, are described in Calem and Canner (1995). 
Alternative procedures developed by the Office of the Comptroller 
of the Currency are described by Stengel and Glennon (1999) and 
Courchane, Nebhut, and Nickerson (2000). 
Traditional Enforcement Methods 
Calem and Canner (1995) begin by describing what they call “the 
traditional fair-lending enforcement method.” 
To help assess the consistency of underwriting 
decisions, examiners traditionally have applied a 
technique known as “comparative loan file review” or 
“matched-pair analysis.”...The examiners begin by 
selecting a sample of applications. Next, they note on 
“Applicant Profile Worksheets” the key factors 
considered in the underwriting decision, and the 
disposition of each application. The examiners then 
evaluate the information on these spreadsheets to 
identify potential instances of disparate treatment of 
similarly qualified applicants. (pp. 118-119) 
They then discuss various problems with this approach. Our own 
evaluation, which is presented below, builds on this analysis. 
According to Calem and Canner,  
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The traditional matched-pair examination procedure 
suffers from two important limitations. First, it is 
difficult for examiners to find applicants that are 
perfect, or even close, matches; some differences in 
underlying financial or property related characteristics 
nearly always remain. 
Such differences in creditworthiness make it difficult to 
identify cases of unequal treatment. Even if there exist 
close matches among an institution’s files, it may be 
difficult for an examiner to find them through manual 
effort alone. Moreover, in some instances, there may 
not be many close matches among the pool of 
applicants. 
The second difficulty with the traditional matched-pair 
approach is that even if some differences in treatment 
are detected, it is hard to determine whether these are 
isolated events that do not result from discrimination, or 
the result of a pattern or practice of discrimination. 
Differences in treatment observed for a particular 
“matched pair” could be a purely random outcome of 
the underwriting process. (p. 119) 
Another way to express these limitations is to say that it is difficult, 
if not impossible, to make judgments about the use of a multivariate 
procedure, such as loan underwriting, using one pair of 
observations. A multivariate procedure is one in which a decision is 
based on the weighted values of several different variables. In the 
case of underwriting, a comparison of one minority and one white 
application yields valid inferences about the treatment of that 
minority applicant only if those two applications are both 
comparable on all applicant, loan, and property characteristics and 
representative of other loans with those characteristics. This is an 
extremely demanding standard. Moreover, any procedure that does 
not meet the two above conditions could run into several problems 
not mentioned by Calem and Canner. For example, a case in which a 
minority applicant is expected to meet a higher standard could be 
mistaken for a case in which “comparable” minority and white 
applications are both approved. 
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The Use of Regression Procedures by Fair-lending 
Enforcement Agencies 
Several fair-lending enforcement agencies have supplemented 
traditional enforcement procedures with regression analysis for 
individual large lenders. This approach has been used, for example, 
by the Justice Department (Siskin and Cupingood 1996), the Office 
of Comptroller of the Currency (Stengel and Glennon 1999; 
Courchane, Nebhut, and Nickerson 2000), and the Federal Reserve 
Board (Calem and Canner 1995; Avery, Beeson, and Calem 1997; 
Calem and Longhofer forthcoming).  
Calem and Canner (1995) explain that these procedures were 
developed at the Federal Reserve in an attempt to overcome the 
limitations of traditional enforcement techniques. The Federal 
Reserve’s regression-based technique involves supplementing 
HMDA data for a sample of loan applications, both minority and 
white, submitted to a particular lender.  
Once the data have been collected, the next step in the procedure is 
to estimate a loan-approval regression. 
To gauge the effect of applicant race on the disposition 
of loan applications, examiners, in consultation with 
Reserve Bank economists, construct a statistical model 
of the lender’s underwriting decisions. This model is 
developed on the basis of information gathered from the 
bank’s written underwriting guidelines and from 
interviews with loan officers. Factors considered 
important to the decision of whether to approve an 
application are included as explanatory variables in the 
model of loan disposition. (p. 121) 
The next step involves interpreting the results of this regression. 
If the results of the statistical analysis indicate that the 
race of the applicant is a statistically significant 
predictor of loan disposition, then this is viewed as an 
initial indication that a pattern or practice of 
discrimination may exist. 
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However, the statistical model is necessarily an 
abstraction that can only partially replicate the loan 
approval process. Each and every factor that might 
reasonably influence an underwriting decision cannot 
possibly be incorporated into a model. Therefore, the 
statistical results alone are not considered definitive. In 
order to more fully evaluate the discrimination issue, 
examiners select specific loan files for closer review. 
(p. 123) 
The loan files selected for further review are minority/white pairs 
consisting of “minority applicants who have been denied credit and 
who appear as well qualified as, or better than, white applicants who 
were approved” (Calem and Canner 1995, 123). For these file pairs, 
which appear to involve discrimination, the examiners try to identify 
a legitimate business explanation for the relatively unfavorable 
treatment of the minority applicant. If any such explanation is 
found, the file is not considered to be a case of discrimination. As 
Calem and Canner (1995, 124) put it, “examiners may find that 
factors omitted from the model may account for these decisions.” 
See also Calem and Longhofer (forthcoming) and Stengel and 
Glennon (1999). 
Although similar to those developed by the Federal Reserve, the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) procedures 
described by Courchane, Nebhut, and Nickerson (2000) place more 
weight on the statistical analysis and less weight on the follow-up 
comparisons of loan files. 
What Is Wrong with the Fair-Lending 
Enforcement System? 
The new regression procedures used by several fair-lending 
enforcement agencies are valuable contributions to the fair-lending 
enforcement system. Most importantly, they recognize that building 
a prima facie case for discrimination requires a multivariate 
procedure. Even with these new procedures, however, this system 
retains two serious limitations: it misses many instances of 
disparate-treatment discrimination and it fails to look for disparate-
impact discrimination at all.17 
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The Need to Obtain an Accurate Estimate of 
Disparate-Treatment Discrimination 
Enforcement procedures to measure disparate-treatment 
discrimination should, of course, be as accurate as possible. 
According to the official interagency definition, discrimination in 
loan approval exists when, among other things, lenders “use 
different standards in determining whether to extend credit” to 
people in a legally protected class (FFIEC 1999, ii). The 
underwriting standards to which this definition applies depend upon 
many applicant, loan, and property characteristics. These standards 
cannot be directly observed but must instead be inferred from the 
actions taken by lenders through the use of a multivariate statistical 
procedure; in other words, an accurate enforcement procedure 
requires a multivariate analysis. 
The new regression procedures used by fair-lending enforcement 
agencies represent a significant step in the right direction because 
they recognize this principle. Compared to traditional file reviews, 
in other words, these regressions lead to a process that is more likely 
to find discrimination when it exists and less likely to find 
discrimination when it does not exist. As they are currently 
designed, however, the file-review procedures used by the Federal 
Reserve appear to forget this principle and therefore have the 
potential to undermine the gains from using regressions. The 
problem here lies not with file reviews as such, but instead with the 
way information from file reviews is used by some enforcement 
agencies. 
To be specific, information from post-regression file reviews can be 
used in two ways. The first way, which is the one built into the 
Federal Reserve procedure, is to search for “information that would 
legitimately account for the divergent credit decisions” (Calem and 
Canner 1995, 124), that is, for benign explanations for cases in 
which minority applicants appear to have been treated less favorably 
than comparable whites. 
Unfortunately, however, this approach runs into exactly the same 
problems as traditional file reviews, namely, that it may be difficult 
to identify comparable files and any two files identified as 
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comparable may still differ in important ways. Calem and Canner 
admit this when they say that their new procedure “is very similar to 
the ‘matched-pair’ technique traditionally used by examiners” (p. 
123). However, they go on to argue that the new approach is better 
because “the statistical model guides the identification of matched 
pairs for review” (p. 123). It is no doubt true that the quality of the 
matches is improved through the use of the statistical model, but a 
model cannot eliminate the problem. Even if two matched files have 
identical values for “key underwriting variables,” they are bound to 
differ on some other characteristics, and it is not logically possible 
for a file review to determine the impact of these differences on the 
underwriting decision. In short, a file review cannot provide an 
alternative test for the hypothesis that discrimination exists. 
The information from post-regression file reviews can also be used 
to improve the regression specification or to do tests for the 
robustness of the results. The OCC procedures in Courchane, 
Nebhut, and Nickerson (2000) appear to follow this approach. This 
second way of using the information is consistent with the principle 
that underwriting discrimination cannot be identified without a 
multivariate procedure. Consider the examples provided by Calem 
and Canner (1995). If some applicants are unable to document all 
reported income, then regulators should re-estimate the regression 
with an “unable to document” variable. If underwriters make a 
distinction between revolving debt and installment debt in scoring 
late payments, then regulators should estimate a regression that 
incorporates this distinction. These revised regressions would make 
full use of the information in the file reviews without giving up the 
regression’s multivariate structure. 
Another way to put this is that file reviews may be able to identify 
underwriting factors that were missed in an initial regression, but 
they cannot determine the weights placed on these underwriting 
factors. As explained earlier, these weights cannot be directly 
observed but instead must be inferred using multivariate statistics. It 
is not logically possible to determine whether a newly identified 
underwriting factor can explain a minority rejection without 
estimating the weight placed on this factor by the lender—and 
controlling for other factors. 
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The lesson from this analysis is that a formal test for disparate-
treatment discrimination requires a multivariate underwriting model 
estimated with a carefully determined specification and carefully 
collected data. The specification of this model should reflect, as 
fully as possible, a lender’s stated underwriting standards, and it 
should, to the extent possible, incorporate lessons learned from 
interviews or file reviews. Fair lending laws require lenders to use 
the same underwriting standards for all applicants, regardless of 
their group membership. Allowing lenders to evaluate applications 
on the basis of idiosyncratic factors and to place unobservable 
weights on these factors in making their underwriting decisions 
eviscerates these laws by making it impossible to determine whether 
common standards are applied to all applicants. Thus, fair lending 
laws cannot be enforced unless lenders are held to a standard of 
equal treatment based on an available and objective standard, 
namely, a multivariate analysis of the lender’s loan-denial decisions. 
Because a regression analysis inevitably involves judgments, a 
lender should, of course, be allowed to comment on a regression 
analysis that finds it practices disparate-treatment discrimination. In 
our view, a thoughtfully conducted loan-approval regression that 
finds a significantly higher loan-denial rate for minorities than for 
whites, controlling for credit characteristics, establishes a prima 
facie case for disparate-treatment discrimination and therefore shifts 
the burden of proof onto the lender. In this situation, the lender can 
escape the charge of disparate-treatment discrimination only if it can 
provide an alternative regression specification that is consistent with 
its expressed underwriting policies (and with principles of 
regression methodology) and that indicates no significant difference 
in loan approval between minority and white applicants. 
The Need to Look for Disparate-Impact Discrimination 
Both the traditional enforcement policies and the regression-based 
policies developed by several fair-lending enforcement agencies 
also have another major flaw: they are incapable of identifying most 
cases of disparate-impact discrimination. In fact, as stated in Avery, 
Beeson, and Calem (1997), Stengel and Glennon (1999), and 
Courchane, Nebhut, and Nickerson (2000), the explicit purpose of 
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the regression-based procedures is to identify disparate-treatment 
discrimination alone. As Avery and his colleagues (1997) put it: 
In any statistical analysis of discrimination (parametric 
or nonparametric), the goal is to determine whether or 
not the treatment of an individual would have been 
different had the individual been of a different minority 
status. (p. 14) 
This is a textbook definition of disparate-treatment discrimination 
and it completely ignores behavior that has a disparate impact on 
members of a minority group. The fair-lending enforcement 
agencies are responsible for identifying both disparate-treatment and 
disparate-impact discrimination, and it makes no sense to rely 
exclusively on methods that, in effect, simply look the other way 
when confronted with the possibility of disparate-impact 
discrimination. 
As shown by Ross and Yinger (forthcoming), disparate-impact 
discrimination can enter a loan-approval regression in two ways. 
First, it can show up in the estimated difference in loan approval 
between minority and white applicants, controlling for credit 
characteristics, if the regression specification does not exactly 
accurately reflect a lender’s actual underwriting standards. Second, 
it can show up in the estimated weights for the credit characteristics, 
and therefore will not be recognized as discrimination in a loan-
approval regression. 
The first possibility needs to be considered because it helps to show 
why looking for disparate-impact discrimination is so important. 
Specifically, an investigator following the Federal Reserve 
procedures (or a lender responding to them) might be able to reduce 
apparent discrimination, as indicated by the estimated minority-
white difference in loan approval, controlling for credit 
characteristics, by introducing a lender’s idiosyncratic, but 
illegitimate, underwriting standards into the specification of the 
regression. This step could shift the effect of disparate-impact 
discrimination from the estimated minority-white difference in loan 
approval to the estimated weights of individual credit 
characteristics, where it will not be observed. Thus, the search for 
the “correct” specification, that is, the specification most accurately 
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portraying a lender’s underwriting criteria, a search that is central to 
the logic of the Federal Reserve’s regression procedure, can be seen 
as a way to ensure that disparate-impact discrimination is ignored. 
The problem runs even deeper than this, however. As shown in such 
a compelling fashion by Buist, Linneman, and Megbolugbe (1999) 
and Blackburn and Vermilyea (2001), lenders may be able to hide 
disparate-treatment discrimination by transforming it into disparate-
impact discrimination. In this case, the Federal Reserve’s regression 
procedure could miss discrimination altogether, even when it is 
severe. Indeed, we believe it is inappropriate—if not irresponsible—
for these agencies to use a procedure that violates the FFIEC guide 
by assuming that disparate-treatment discrimination is the only kind 
worth looking for. 
How Can the Fair-Lending Enforcement System 
Be Improved? 
In our judgment, the current fair-lending enforcement system is 
seriously inadequate because it is likely to miss some cases of 
discrimination in loan approval that take the form of disparate 
treatment and is incapable of identifying loan-approval 
discrimination that takes the form of disparate-impact.18 
We propose three steps for eliminating these flaws. 
1. The fair-lending enforcement agencies should come up with 
the resources needed to make certain that they are not 
missing a large share of existing disparate-treatment 
discrimination. Multivariate regressions should be employed 
by all these agencies; these methods should be based on 
virtually complete information; and loan file reviews should 
be treated as a method for improving, not overruling, 
regression analysis. 
2. These agencies should conduct loan-approval regressions 
based on applications submitted to a large sample of lenders. 
These regressions should recognize the complexity of 
underwriting standards and the possibility that these 
standards vary systematically across lenders based on their 
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loan portfolios. This tool makes it possible to estimate the 
extent of discrimination by each lender in the sample, 
regardless of whether that discrimination takes the form of 
disparate impact or of disparate treatment. Moreover, 
because it is based on a large sample, this tool provides 
precise estimates of the weights placed on a wide range of 
underwriting variables, yields an estimate of discrimination 
even for lenders that are too small for current regression 
procedures, and eliminates the arbitrary separation of 
lenders based on the agency that regulates them. In short, 
this tool provides the best possible lender-specific estimates 
of discrimination that are available without loan-
performance information and is an ideal way to determine if 
there is a prima facie case for discrimination by any lender 
in the sample. 
A lender should of course be allowed to build a business-
necessity defense. In this case, however, a lender cannot 
mount such a defense by adding its own idiosyncratic 
underwriting criteria to a loan-approval regression. Not only 
can a lender hide intentional discrimination by manipulating 
its underwriting weights, but, as shown earlier, these weights 
may reflect discrimination even if they are based on an 
apparently group-neutral analysis of loan performance. 
Instead, a lender cannot defend the underwriting weights it 
uses on business necessity grounds unless it can demonstrate 
that these weights do a better job of predicting loan 
performance (as measured, say, by loan default) than the 
weights implied by the enforcement agency’s regression. 
Following the non-discrimination test developed earlier, this 
demonstration must apply within each ethnic group, not to 
all groups combined. 
3. The fair-lending enforcement agencies should implement a 
performance-based analysis of loan-approval decisions to 
supplement the first tool. This second enforcement tool 
requires an enforcement agency to estimate a model of the 
factors that determine loan default or some other measure of 
loan performance, which is the type of model on which an 
automated underwriting system is based. More specifically, 
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this tool compares the minority composition of the 
applications that have the highest predicted loan 
performance based on this loan-performance model with the 
minority composition of the applications a lender actually 
approves.19 Discrimination exists if significantly more 
minority applications would be approved on the basis of the 
agency’s predicted performance than are actually approved 
on the basis of the lender’s underwriting standards.  
This tool requires information on loan performance and on 
credit characteristics for a large sample of loans, which the 
fair-lending agencies have, so far, been reluctant to obtain, 
even though they have the power to do so. However, it does 
not require the investigator to know the formulas behind a 
lender’s underwriting standards or credit scores, which may 
be considered proprietary. This tool, like the previous one, 
captures both disparate-impact and disparate-treatment 
discrimination but cannot tell them apart. 
This tool would yield more precise answers about 
discrimination than the first tool, but it would obviously be 
more costly to implement. Loan performance is observed by 
the institution servicing a loan, which may not be the same 
as the institution that issued the loan. To examine 
discrimination in underwriting, therefore, regulators must 
develop procedures that link loan performance information 
with information about the issuing lender. These issues arise 
even for large lenders that originate and then continue to 
service many loans. After all, these lenders also sell some of 
their loans on the secondary market, and the sample of loans 
they retain is not a random sample of the loans they 
originate. 
To build a business-necessity defense in this case, a lender 
would have to show that its underwriting weights are 
derived from a loan-performance model that does a better 
job of predicting within-group loan performance than does 
the model estimated by regulators. If an enforcement agency 
has made a prima facie case for discrimination and the 
lender cannot supply an alternative loan-performance model 
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that meets this non-discrimination test, then the third part of 
a disparate-impact case is automatically satisfied. Under 
these circumstances, the loan-performance model estimated 
by the enforcement agency provides an alternative 
underwriting scheme that meets the lender’s legitimate 
business objectives without any discrimination. 
Although our second and third recommendations would require 
lenders to provide information from their loan files, they are 
designed, in part, to protect lenders from unwarranted charges of 
discriminatory behavior. Recall that we recommend stringent 
standards for establishing a prima facie case for disparate-impact 
discrimination, based on a multivariate procedure. Regulators 
should make it clear that the selection of a lender for further 
investigation does not imply that the regulator has already built a 
prima facie case for discrimination by that lender. Just as an income-
tax audit does not imply that a taxpayer has cheated on his taxes, a 
lending investigation does not imply that a lender has practiced 
discrimination. Instead, a lender is charged with discrimination only 
if a statistical procedure finds a minority-white disparity after 
controlling for all legitimate underwriting variables. With these 
procedures, a lender that does not discriminate has nothing to worry 
about. 
Despite their unique ability to collect the relevant data, the fair-
lending enforcement agencies have decided not to provide the public 
with any credible evidence on the current extent of discrimination in 
mortgage underwriting. As in the case of fair-lending enforcement, 
they apparently favor looking the other way. Consequently, neither 
we nor anyone else knows how much of this discrimination still 
exists. According to the best available evidence, however, extensive 
underwriting discrimination existed in 1990, and there is no more 
recent evidence to show that this discrimination has gone away. 
Moreover, black and Hispanic households continue to have 
homeownership and loan-approval rates that are far below the rates 
attained by white households, even after controlling for income and 
other factors (Gyourko, Linneman, and Wachter 1999). 
Under these circumstances, this nation cannot begin to live up to the 
important principles embodied in its fair-lending laws without 
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actively searching for mortgage discrimination in all its possible 
forms, using the most accurate tools possible. The current fair-
lending enforcement system does not even come close to meeting 
this standard. 
It does not have to be this way. More comprehensive and accurate 
enforcement tools that build on a large body of scholarly research 
and are consistent with legal standards are readily available. We 
strongly urge the fair-lending enforcement agencies to make these 
tools a regular part of their enforcement activities. We also urge 
interested citizens, community groups, academics, lenders and other 
participants in the mortgage market, and public officials to work for 
improvements in the fair-lending enforcement system. Every 
American household should be able to enter the mortgage market 
feeling confident that it will not encounter discrimination.
 
1FaHA and ECOA also prohibit “redlining,” defined as unfavorable 
actions by a lender toward loans involving properties in 
neighborhoods where members of a protected class are located. 
Redlining is not considered in this policy brief. 
2 U.S. Code Title 15, Chapter 41, Section 1691.  
3Nondepository lenders obtain mortgage capital from investors in 
the secondary mortgage market, instead of from deposits. These 
investors want to receive their income in the form of mortgage 
interest payments. See the citations in note 14. 
4For a more detailed discussion of the enforcement duties of these 
two agencies, see Schwemm (1994) or Yinger (1995). 
5A fourth reason, which is too technical for full discussion in this 
policy brief, is that discrimination may be profitable, and therefore 
may not be eliminated by competition. For more on this view, see 
Ferguson and Peters (2000), Longhofer and Peters (1998), and Ross 
and Yinger (forthcoming). 
 
Endnotes 
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6Avery et al. (1996) discuss several other HMDA results that are 
consistent with, but do not prove, the existence of discrimination. 
7See FFIEC (2001b), which is the source of all the numbers in this 
paragraph. The pre-1995 HMDA data are not comparable to data for 
1995 and later years. See Scheessele (1998). 
8Munnell et al. (1996) also explored a wide range of alternative 
specifications for their estimating equation and found that their 
result was remarkably robust to these changes. 
9Several scholars have also argued that Munnell et al. (1996) should 
have looked at loan defaults, not loan approvals. Ross and Yinger 
(forthcoming) examine this argument in detail and show that it is not 
correct. 
10The federal fair-lending agencies have the authority to collect the 
information needed to replicate this study but they have not done so. 
This lack of replication is itself a powerful indictment of these 
agencies. In our judgment, one of the principal responsibilities of 
any civil-rights enforcement agency is to educate the public on the 
magnitude of the problem. 
11The trends in the HMDA data do not, of course, prove that 
discrimination remains at its 1990 level. In principle, a decline in 
discrimination since 1990 could have been accompanied by a 
deterioration in the relative creditworthiness of black and Hispanic 
applicants. We know of no evidence, however, that this type of 
deterioration has taken place. 
12Because of this possibility, civil rights laws that only cover 
disparate-treatment discrimination have an enormous loophole. 
13Both Buist, Linneman, and Megbolugbe (1999) and Blackburn and 
Vermilyea (2001) interpret their results as evidence that one cannot 
tell whether lenders practice disparate-treatment discrimination, 
practice disparate-impact discrimination, or simply use different 
underwriting standards on legitimate business grounds. As 
explained earlier, however, Ross and Yinger (forthcoming) rule out 
the third possibility (using the same data as Buist, Linneman, and 
Megbolugbe (1999)). Moreover, Blackburn and Vermilyea (2001) 
show that inter-group differences in loan approval are explained by 
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across-lender differences in the definitions of underwriting 
variables, not in the weights placed on common underwriting 
variables. (For example, one lender might have special rules for 
mortgages with a loan-to-value ratio, LTV, above 0.90, whereas 
another might use an LTV cut-off of 0.95.) It seems unlikely that 
these idiosyncratic differences in definitions are justified by a link to 
performance data, which would be required for a business-necessity 
defense. 
14The increased reliance on automated underwriting is related to 
several other trends, including a trend toward “unbundling” various 
mortgage services, the emergence of mortgage bankers, and the 
growth of the secondary mortgage market. See Follain and Zorn 
(1990), LaCour-Litttle (2000), Lea (1996), Ross and Yinger 
(forthcoming), and Van Order (2000). 
15The actual statistical procedures are considered proprietary and are 
not released, but the available descriptions of the schemes never 
mention group membership variables. 
16In technical terms, this is an example of omitted variable bias in a 
regression analysis. See Ross and Yinger (forthcoming). 
17Several other weaknesses of the current enforcement system are 
discussed in Ross and Yinger (forthcoming). 
18The fair-lending enforcement system could also do a better job 
preventing discrimination in lender actions other than loan approval, 
such as loan pricing. See Ross and Yinger (forthcoming). 
19If a lender has approved A applications, then this test compares the 
minority composition of approved loans with that of the A highest-
ranking applications according to the enforcement agency’s loan-
performance model. See Ross and Yinger (forthcoming). 
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